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DD/R # 239-63

8 February 1963

BRIEF FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Procedures for Foreign Travel of Personnel
Possessing Special Security Clearances

1. At its meeting on 19 September 1962, the United States Intelligence Board requested that the Security Committee, in coordination with the SIGINT Committee, review the existing regulations and procedures, including pertinent provisions of DCID No. 6/3, which control the foreign travel of COMINT-indoctrinated personnel to hazardous areas. The review was extended to include clearances for T, K-H, and [REDACTED] as 25X1A the same problems are applicable.

2. This review resulted from the proposed foreign travel of two consultants of NSA to attend an International Symposium in Moscow. NSA had denied permission to travel and submitted the matter to the Board for consideration. The decision of NSA was confirmed by the Board but questions were raised as to the procedures being followed, particularly as concerns individuals holding clearances with more than one agency.

3. The Security Committee, in coordination with the SIGINT Committee, reviewed DCID No. 6/3 and concluded that as now written it provides adequate policy guidance for the control of foreign travel by persons indoctrinated for COMINT.

4. The Committee noted no particular problem concerning the foreign travel of staff employees of Government. Two problems were noted as concerns consultants and contractor personnel. Such individuals are frequently utilized in a sensitive capacity by more than one Government agency and a coordinating

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program is not provided which would allow the total assessment of the security risks against the sensitive intelligence involved. This paper provides for a coordinating system whereby a check can be made of the central indices for T, K-H, [REDACTED] and 25X1A for COMINT-indoctrinated industrial personnel. This will permit the proper assessment on the basis of full knowledge of the sensitive intelligence possessed by one individual.

5. The second problem concerns the lack of authority by Government to enforce travel restrictions upon consultants and contractor personnel possessing sensitive intelligence. The effectiveness of restrictive actions depends largely on the cooperativeness of the personnel involved. Security briefing programs and the inclusion within security indoctrination forms of restrictions upon travel should assist in making these controls more effective. Further, placing a responsibility upon a contractor for ensuring that his employees comply with such procedures will assist to some degree.

6. An appeal mechanism is provided for to the USIB, when proposed travel is denied and the individual feels that an appeal is justified.


7. The Committee is recommending the following procedures be implemented:

- (a) Each department and agency ensure the assessment of the risks involved in private foreign travel of employees to denied areas and effect coordination with other agencies as necessary and appropriate.
- (b) Each department and agency should check the central indices maintained for T, K-H, [REDACTED] and COMINT 25X1A prior to granting approval to consultants and contractor personnel to travel to hazardous areas. Where such clearances do exist, the initial department or agency should effect the

necessary coordination to assure that the total access to sensitive intelligence is assessed against the risks involved.

- (c) Where foreign travel to a hazardous area is approved, the traveller should be given a security briefing on the risks involved and should be debriefed as appropriate upon return to ensure the reporting of pertinent information.
- (d) Where the request for approval is denied, the requestor should be informed generally as to reasons for the denial. Where an appeal is made for reconsideration of a denial for travel, the head of the agency concerned, at his discretion, may refer the matter to the USIB for consideration.
- (e) Departments and agencies should notify promptly through USIB other agencies within the intelligence community of those instances wherein an individual disregards the denial of a travel request and proceeds abroad to a denied area.

25X1A


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cc: DDCI